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Executive Summary
Following the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) component of NAFTA beginning on January 1,
1989, over 7 years of experience provides some preliminary conclusions about the impact of
CFTA/NAFTA.  The two principal objectives of this study are to (1) measure the contributions of
CFTA/NAFTA to the agricultural trade of Canada and the United States, and (2) quantify the level and
distribution of benefits and costs of further liberalization of agricultural trade between the two countries.
Multivariate statistical analysis techniques were used to separate the impacts of the agreement on bilateral
agricultural trade from (a) changes in the exchange rate, and (b) other forces--including growth in per
capita income--associated with general growth in economic activity in both countries.  We examined
separately U.S. agricultural exports to Canada, and Canadian exports to the United States over the 27-year
period 1969-1995--20 years prior to the agreement and seven years under the agreement. Three variables
captured most of the forces shaping bilateral trade since 1969:  the CFTA/NAFTA, the real exchange rate,
and a linear trend.  The linear trend is a proxy for income growth and other slowly changing variables over
time.
CFTA/NAFTA is estimated annually to add $1,430 million of U.S. agricultural exports to Canada and
$1,884 million of Canadian agricultural exports to the United States.  Thus CFTA/NAFTA contributed an
estimated 25 percent of the $5.8 billion of U.S. agricultural exports to Canada in 1995.
Classical welfare analysis was used to estimate the implications of free trade in the dairy, poultry, sugar,
and other industries that continue to be protected.  With free trade, increased U.S. exports of dairy products
to Canada bring a small increase in milk prices in the U.S. and a large decline in milk prices in Canada,
causing a downsizing of the Canadian dairy industry.  The major beneficiaries of free trade are Canadian
consumers and U.S. producers.  The net welfare gain to both countries is positive, and totals a present
value of nearly $2 billion if discounted at 5% is perpetuity. With free trade, an increase in egg exports to
Canada has a very small upward impact on prices in the U.S. but a price drop in Canada.  A significant
redistribution of welfare from Canadian producers to Canadian consumers occurs. Poultry and dairy are
highly protected in Canada, and major welfare gain accrue to that country from liberalization.  In contrast,
sugar is heavily protected in the U.S. and major gains accrue to the U.S. and losses to Canada from
liberalization.  With complete liberalization by the U.S. and Canada, world price rises to 17 cents per
pound.  The rising world sugar price costs Canadian consumers $77 million.  Canadian producers gain $10
million, but their production is too small to avoid a loss of $67 million to the Canadian public at large. 
Benefits of bilateral liberalization of peanut, tobacco, and durum wheat industries were not large.
In aggregate, consumers benefit from liberalization by nearly $1 billion per year in each country.  Losses to
Canadian producers are absolutely and relatively greater than to U.S. producers.  Overall deadweight gains
are positive to each country.  The annual combined two-country addition to national income ($292 million)
totals a present value of $5.8 billion when discounted in perpetuity at a 5 percent rate.￿
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Luther Tweeten, Jerry Sharples, and Linda Evers-Smith
The Canada-US bilateral component of NAFTA began on January 1, 1989 when the Canadian-US
Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) went into effect.  We now have over 7 years of experience with
that component of NAFTA--enough years to draw some preliminary conclusions about its impact.
This paper has two principal objectives:
•  To measure the contributions of CFTA/NAFTA to the agricultural trade of Canada and
the United States, and
•  To quantify the level and distribution of benefits and costs of further liberalization of
agricultural trade between the two countries.
Before addressing these objectives, we examine how agricultural trade of the two countries has
fared since 1989.
THE SETTING
Trade of goods and services between the United States and Canada is important for the United
States and vitally important for Canada.  The same is true for agricultural trade.  About 50
percent of Canada's agricultural exports go to the U.S. and 35 percent of Canada's agricultural
imports come from the U.S.  For the United States, 11 percent of agricultural exports go to
Canada and 19 percent of imports come from Canada (4)
2.  U.S. agricultural exports to Canada
totaled $5.8 billion in fiscal 1996, second only to Japan.
In the late 1980s, political leaders in both countries believed that a bilateral trade agreement was
in their own best interests.
3  The turbulent conditions in global agricultural markets and the new
GATT negotiations provided additional incentives for improving the environment for trade
￿4GURGEVKXGN[￿ #PFGTUQP 2TQHGUUQT￿ 5GPKQT 4GUGCTEJGT￿ CPF HQTOGT 4GUGCTEJ #UUQEKCVG￿
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+PVGTPCVKQPCN #ITKEWNVWTCN 6TCFG 4GUGCTEJ %QPUQTVKWO￿ 9CUJKPIVQP￿ &%￿ &GEGODGT ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿0WODGT KP RCTGPVJGUKU TGHGTU VQ CP KVGO KP VJG NKUV QH TGHGTGPEGU￿
￿(QT OQTG QP VJG DCEMITQWPF VQ VJG %(6#￿ UGG ￿￿￿￿￿￿
between the two countries.  Compared to agricultural tariffs in other countries, the tariffs of
Canada and the United States were not high:  U.S. rates averaged 3.3 percent, Canada's 9.9
percent.  However, nontariff barriers to trade by both countries, such as quotas and licenses,
tended to be more restrictive.  
Both countries saw agricultural export potential across the border.  But Canada was frustrated by
U.S. dumping and countervailing duty laws, as well as non-tariff barriers.  Canada was looking for
more secure access to U.S. markets based upon clear rules supported by a binding dispute-
resolution procedure.  The United States wanted improved access to the Canadian market and the
elimination of freight rate subsidies to prairie grain.
CFTA/NAFTA:  The Agricultural Component
In the final agreement, both countries agreed to reduce agricultural trade barriers and to follow a
specified procedure for resolving disputes.  For agriculture, however, the CFTA was not in fact a
“free trade” agreement.  The most sheltered domestic industries in both countries continued to be
protected from import competition.
The agricultural provisions of the CFTA are listed in table 1.  Key provisions are:
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   • Eliminate nearly all tariffs within 10 years (by 1/1/1998)
   • Temporary tariff protection for fresh fruits and vegetables for up to 20 years
   • U.S. liberalize import of certain Canadian products containing sugar
   • Canada eliminate import licenses for U.S. grain and their products when the level of
support provided by U.S. programs declined to the level in Canada.  But either country
could impose import restrictions if grain imports increased due to changes in grain policies
in the exporting country.
   • Each country exempt from the meat import restrictions of the other.
   • Neither country to apply direct subsidies to exports to the other.
   • Procedures specified for settling disputes and reviewing trade barriers.
When NAFTA became law on January 1, 1994 it incorporated all the agricultural components of
the CFTA.   The agreement allowed the two countries to more fully reveal their respective
comparative advantage.
￿6JGUG CTG CDUVTCEVGF HTQO ￿￿￿￿ RCIGU ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Revealed Comparative Advantage
Data on trade of agricultural products in 1995 reveal where comparative advantage lies at the
1995 stage of liberalization of Canadian and U.S. agricultural markets (table 2).  The United
States has a comparative advantage primarily in fruits and vegetables and their products.  U.S.
exports to Canada of products in this category exceed by four times its imports from Canada. 
Canada has a strong comparative advantage in trade of live animals.  The value of Canadian
exports to the United States of live animals exceeds U.S. exports to Canada by a factor of ten. 
Perhaps the most revealing information in table 2 is the similarity of agricultural trade in both
directions.  The distribution of trade among the various categories is approximately the same for
U.S. agricultural products going north as for Canadian products going south.  This is additional
evidence of the similarity of agricultural supply and demand on both sides of the border.
However, many significant one-way trade flows of very specific products are hidden within
product categories.  For example, some meat products exported by the United States are quite
different from those exported by Canada.  Within the “oilseeds and products” category, soybeans
go north and canola goes south.
Canadian and U.S. agricultural markets have much in common.  Technology and the costs of
labor and capital are similar in the two countries.  The feed and livestock sectors are very
important to both.  The marketing infrastructure is comparable.  Consumers in both countries
have similar incomes and food preferences.  As a consequence, Canadian and U.S. farmers have
the potential to produce similar products at roughly the same cost.  And Canadian consumers
have similar food purchasing patterns.
But the two agricultural sectors have a political history of going their own way.  Each country
protected and subsidized major parts of its own agricultural industries. Barriers to agricultural
trade were erected.  Exports were subsidized.  Protection and subsidies reached new heights in
the mid-1980s.  As a result, agricultural products primarily moved east-west.  Cross-border trade
was more difficult and costly than within-country shipments because of (a) transportation systems
that were built only to serve within-country needs, (b) barriers at the US-Canadian border, and (c)
a Canadian subsidy on east-west movement of grain.  Even under these conditions, however,
there was substantial agricultural trade between the United States and Canada prior to the CFTA.
Major changes are taking place in agricultural policy and politics in the two countries.  The
CFTA/NAFTA, one component of that change, is reducing the barriers to moving agricultural
products north and south across the border.  The subsidy on transportation of Canadian prairie
grains and other crops under the Western Grain Transportation Act was eliminated on August 1,
1995.  In addition, both countries are unilaterally reducing constraints and subsidies to agricultural
production.  As trade barriers come down, farms, firms, and industries on both sides of the U.S.-￿
Canadian border are being forced to adjust to new opportunities and new competition.  Canadian
agriculture, due to its smaller size and higher protection, is facing larger adjustments.
This process of liberalization and integration being observed between the United States and
Canada has been going on within the European Union for some time.  The trade data discussed
above suggest that this process of integration also is taking place between the U.S. and Canadian
agricultural sectors, encouraging trade.
IMPACT OF THE CFTA/NAFTA
More Trade
In response to changes in policies and economic conditions, agricultural trade between Canada
and the United States is rapidly increasing.  Between 1989 and 1995, two-way U.S.-Canadian
agricultural trade increased 120 percent, whereas over the previous 6 years, it increased only 39
percent.  By comparison, combined U.S. agricultural imports and exports to all countries
increased only 39 percent between 1989 and 1995, and 12 percent the previous 6 years (USDA
data). 
Figures 1-9 show U.S.-Canadian agricultural trade from a U.S. perspective
5.  They show how
bilateral trade has progressed during seven years since the beginning of the CFTA (i.e., to the
right of the vertical bar in each figure) relative to the seven previous years.  They show:
      • During the CFTA years the share of the United States agricultural exports going to
Canada has sharply increased.  During the first five years of the CFTA, the Canadian
market was about the only source of growth of U.S. exports.  Prior to the CFTA, the
Canadian share of a volatile U.S. export market was surprisingly stable (figures 1 and 2). 
     • The Canadian share of U.S. agricultural imports started increasing 2 years prior to the
CFTA, and has since continued to increase.  The dip in 1995 was due to an unusually large
increase in the value of U.S. exports to other countries (figures 3 and 4).
     • The main source of growth in U.S. exports to Canada during the CFTA has been
vegetables and vegetable products.  Notable increases also occurred with fruits and their
products, “other meat” (excludes poultry), and poultry (figures 5 and 6).
     • Expansion of U.S. imports of grains, feeds, and related products accounts for much of the
growth in total imports from Canada since the CFTA began.  Expansion also occurred--
￿6JG FCVC UQWTEG HQT VJGUG HKIWTGU KU ￿￿￿￿ 6JG #PPGZ EQORCTGU VTCFG UVCVKUVKEU HTQO 7￿5￿ CPF
%CPCFKCP UQWTEGU￿￿
before and after the CFTA--in meat products, oilseeds and products, and “fruits, nuts,
vegetables, and their products” (figures 7 and 8).
     • Averaged over the 14 years of data shown in figure 9, the value of U.S. agricultural
imports from Canada has about equaled the value of exports to Canada. 
Did the CFTA/NAFTA Cause the Increased Trade?
A number of factors other than the CFTA/NAFTA could have influenced bilateral agricultural
trade since 1988.  de Janvry (2), examining the impact of NAFTA on US-Mexico trade, used
econometric analysis to separate effects of the agreement from effects of changes in per capita
income, exchange rates, and a time trend.  He found that over NAFTA's short life to mid-1996,
the agreement increased U.S. exports to Mexico over what they would have been without
NAFTA.  However, NAFTA did not significantly increase Mexican exports to the United States.
The exchange rate also is likely to influence U.S.-Canadian trade.  At the beginning of the
agreement period the Canadian dollar was strong relative to the U.S. dollar.  In recent years it has
weakened. The drop in the value of the Canadian dollar would be expected to make Canadian
goods more competitive in U.S. markets and make U.S. goods less competitive in Canadian
markets.
We attempted to separate the impacts of the agreement on bilateral agricultural trade from (a)
changes in the exchange rate, and (b) other forces--including growth in per capita income--
associated with general growth in economic activity in both countries.  We examined separately
U.S. agricultural exports to Canada, and Canadian exports to the United States over the 27-year
period 1969-1995--20 years prior to the agreement and seven years under the agreement.  For this
simple econometric analysis we assumed that three variables would capture most of the forces
shaping bilateral trade since 1969:  the CFTA/NAFTA, the real exchange rate, and a linear trend. 
The linear trend is a proxy for income growth and other slowly changing variables over time.  The
details are in tables 3 and 4.
This simple model accounts for most of the variation in bilateral agricultural trade, with the
exchange rate and the agreement playing important roles.  The real exchange rate is significantly
associated with U.S. year-to-year movements in exports to Canada since 1969 based on Canadian
data (table 4), but it is not a significant factor elsewhere.  Results indicate a 1 percent decrease in
the Canadian/U.S. real exchange rate increases American agricultural exports to Canada (post-
agreement) by about 0.4 percent.
U.S. and Canadian data on agricultural imports and exports differ for reasons beyond what can be
accounted for by product coverage and transshipments.  (See table 9 and Annex Figure 1 for
differences in data compiled by the two countries.)  Because of the need to collect duties, enforce
quotas, and in general keep domestic producers informed of their competition, imports are
probably measured more accurately than exports.  That was one reason why U.S. agricultural￿
export data were aligned with Canadian agricultural import data in 1990.  Unfortunately, that
adjustment was confounded with the advent of the CFTA, biasing upward the regression
coefficient for the CFTA/NAFTA impact on U.S. agricultural exports to Canada shown in table 3.
Table 4 contains the same regression equation specification as Table 3 but using Canadian data on
agricultural trade.  The result is significant positive coefficients for CFTA/NAFTA as in Table 3,
but the agreement is estimated to increase U.S. agricultural exports to Canada by $481 million
(versus $2,379 million based on U.S. data) and to boost Canadian agricultural exports to the U.S.
by $2,203 million (versus $1,566 million based on U.S. data).  If we arbitrarily average the two
estimates to form the “best” estimate, then CFTA/NAFTA is estimated annually to add $1,430
million of U.S. agricultural exports to Canada and $1,884 million of Canadian agricultural exports
to the United States.  Thus CFTA/NAFTA contributed an estimated 25 percent of the $5.8 billion
of U.S. agricultural exports to Canada in 1995.
The significant positive coefficients of the linear trend variable suggest that other forces were
associated with steady growth in bilateral trade throughout the 27-year period.  The estimated
coefficients for this variable indicate that, once the effects of exchange rates and the
CFTA/NAFTA are removed, Canadian exports to the U.S. grew each year at about the same rate
as U.S. exports to Canada.
Our finding that the CFTA/NAFTA had a significant impact on agricultural exports is quite
sensitive to specification of the model.  More sophisticated analysis is called for to estimate the
unique impacts of exchange rates and the agreement on bilateral agricultural trade.
More Trade of Manufactured Food Products
The CFTA/NAFTA appears to have encouraged a large expansion of bilateral trade in
manufactured food products (excludes bulk commodities and raw materials).  Prior to the CFTA,
bilateral trade was limited by high tariffs and uncertainty.  After CFTA, Canadian exports of
manufactured food products to the United States were up 125 percent between years 1989 and
1994 alone.  Exports to other destinations were up only 24 percent.  On the other hand, Canadian
imports from the United States were up 58 percent; from other countries up 37 percent (14, page
10).
The Canadian manufactured food sector is making structural changes as a result of
CFTA/NAFTA.  Before CFTA, this sector mainly consisted of small scale plants producing for
the domestic market.  CFTA/NAFTA is providing more export opportunities and import
competition.  Some firms are now producing specialized and brand-name products for the U.S.
market in larger, more efficient plants.  Competition is forcing other plants to shut down.  The net
result is a more efficient sector finding that it can compete in the U.S. market (6, 14).
THE UNFINISHED AGENDA￿
The term “free trade” in CFTA/NAFTA has no timetable for realization in U.S.-Canadian
agricultural trade.  Substantial protection remains in U.S. and Canadian agriculture.  Canada's
dairy and poultry industries, and U.S. sugar, tobacco, and peanut industries remain highly
protected.  As the other parts of agriculture in the two countries become less dependent on
protection, pressures will likely grow for reform of these remaining industries.  Estimates of
potential welfare gains and loses from additional reform are included in the following pages,
drawing from existing studies where possible (see methodology in Annex B).
Economists recognize that costs associated with removing protection are immediate and apparent
to losers, while benefits are longer run and not necessarily apparent to beneficiaries.  As
liberalization progresses, the economic costs are expected to decline relative to the benefits.  As
the years bring fewer losers and more gainers, the political base is expected to grow for more
liberalization and for more of the associated economic integration with trading partners. 
Dairy
We estimated the welfare implications of free trade in the dairy industry using parameters from a
study by Hallberg and Baker (7).  Based upon their results from a static equilibrium model of the
U.S. and Canadian dairy industries in 1990, we calculated the following welfare gains from diary
trade liberalization:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Annual benefit in:
  United States              Canada 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       (million dollars)
Consumer welfare -437  720
Producer welfare  442 -636
a
National welfare    5   84
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
aIncludes loss of quota rent.
With free trade, the United States increases exports of dairy products to Canada.  The increased
exports bring a small increase in milk prices in the U.S. and a large decline in milk prices in
Canada, causing a downsizing of the Canadian dairy industry.  The major beneficiaries of free
trade are Canadian consumers and U.S. producers.  The net welfare gain to both countries is
positive, and totals a present value of nearly $2 billion if discounted at 5% is perpetuity.
Eggs
The North American egg industry is much smaller than the dairy industry but distortions to trade
are also quite large.  We estimated the welfare impacts of free trade in eggs and egg products￿
based on a study by Kim, Schrader, and Dimaranan (9).  They used a static equilibrium simulation
model to represent the egg industry in North America in 1988.
Estimated welfare gains from egg trade liberalization are:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Annual benefits in:
  United States           Canada
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       (million dollars)
Consumer welfare  -52  174
Producer welfare   53 -141
Quota rents
a     0  -14
National welfare    1   19
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
aCanada is assumed to lose the rents associated with the import quotas.
As with the dairy example, the increase in exports to Canada has a very small upward impact on
prices in the U.S. but a large drop in Canada.  Because of the relatively small size of the industry,
net welfare gains are small, but a significant redistribution of welfare from Canadian producers to
Canadian consumers is implied. ￿
Sugar
Estimated welfare gains from sugar trade liberalization are (see Annex B, scenario 4 for
methodology, note conversion of Canadian to U.S. dollars at U.S. $1 = C $1.15):
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Annual benefits in:
  United States
a       Canada
b
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       (million dollars)
Consumer welfare   1,450  -77
Producer welfare  -1,200   10
National welfare     250  -67
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
aMidpoint estimates for 1985 from Council of Economic Advisors (1, p. 159) assuming world
sugar prices increase 50 percent with liberalization.
bAssumes supply elasticity of .3 and demand elasticity of -.24 for Canada under 1990 conditions
(Annex B).
Poultry and dairy are highly protected in Canada, and major welfare gain accrue to that country
from liberalization.  In contrast sugar is heavily protected in the U.S. and major gains accrue to
the U.S. and losses to Canada from liberalization.  With complete liberalization by the U.S. and
Canada, world price rises to 17 cents per pound.  Raising the world sugar price costs Canadian
consumers $77 million.  Canadian producers gain $10 million, but their production is too small to
avoid a large loss of $67 million to the Canadian public at large.
Benefits of peanut liberalization of the protected U.S. market are much smaller, because peanuts
are a small proportion of U.S. farm output and utilize a two-price system largely transferring
income from U.S. consumers to U.S. producers.  Benefits of tobacco liberalization also are small
because savings in production costs could be offset by social costs of higher tobacco consumption
with a lower price.
Durum Wheat and Pasta
A number of studies summarized by Linda Evers-Smith examined the price impacts of distortion
in markets introduced by restrictions on Canadian durum wheat exports to the United States.  We
analyzed welfare impacts under a wide range of price elasticity and other assumptions, but never
found a welfare (deadweight) loss in excess of $1 million.  Transfers of income between
producers and consumers were also modest in relation to those for other commodities.  Our
conclusions is that removal of trade distortions in poultry, dairy, and sugar are of higher priority
than durum wheat (or peanut and tobacco) liberalization.￿￿
CONCLUSIONS AND SELECTED IMPLICATIONS
Summing results from previous tables, we estimate that in aggregate the CFTA/NAFTA trade
reform has added an estimated $1.4 billion to U.S. agricultural exports to Canada and $1.9 billion
to Canadian agricultural exports to the United States.  Thus exports have expanded markedly in
both countries as a result of the agreement.  Given possible errors in the data, it is not possible to
say that the U.S. has gained more or less exports than Canada from the arrangement.
Welfare impacts of more complete liberalization of U.S.-Canadian agricultural trade are
summarized as follows:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Annual benefits in:
  United States
a        Canada
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       (million dollars)
Consumer welfare   961  817
Producer welfare  -705 -767
National welfare   256      36
a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
aSubtracts $14 million of quota rents.
Consumers benefit from liberalization by nearly $1 billion per year in each country, implying
relatively greater benefit to Canadian than to U.S. consumers.  It is notable that losses to
Canadian producers are absolutely and relatively greater than to U.S. producers.  Overall
deadweight gains are positive to each country and are more in line with the size of the agricultural
sectors than are redistributions among producers and consumers.  The annual combined two-
country addition to national income ($256 + $36 million = $292 million) may not seem large but
totals a present value of $5.8 billion when discounted in perpetuity at a 5 percent discount rate.
The above results are primarily determined by the relative sizes of the industries in the two
countries and the absolute and relative size of the trade barrier on both sides of the border.  The
static nature of the analysis may underestimate some benefits and overestimate some costs of
protection.  The cumulative dynamics of improved efficiency forced upon producers by trade
liberalization would change these estimates of welfare costs after more years of adjustment. 
Improvement in the efficiency of transportation, processing, wholesaling, and retailing as a result
of free trade could reduce costs and raise benefits in the longer run.￿￿
Finally, we address implications for adjustment assistance, dispute settlement, north-south trade
rerouting, narrowing domestic policy options, and pressure for monetary union between the U.S.
and Canada.
Adjustment Assistance
The above results indicate that transition to free trade in the highly protected sectors implies large
loses by Canadian poultry and dairy producers and by U.S. sugar producers.  An adjustment
assistance policy could be part of a liberalization package.
Dispute Settlement
A key to the success of NAFTA will be the extent to which the dispute settlement process does in
fact resolve disputes in a timely manner.  Will the disputing parties allow the process to dictate
modifications of domestic policies and procedures?  Answers to these questions will not come
until national reactions to a major dispute can be observed.
The dispute settlement process of NAFTA is being used.  In response to the Uruguay Round
agreement, Canada removed non-tariff trade barriers and replaced them with new tariffs on dairy,
poultry, and barley products, and on margarine.  Some new tariffs exceeded 200 percent.  The
United States claimed that NAFTA did not allow new tariffs.  Canada claimed that in this case the
Uruguay Round commitments superseded NAFTA.  A NAFTA panel was established to resolve
the issue.  A final report released in December 1996 over Canadian tariffs on dairy and poultry
ruled unanimously in favor of Canada.
After the Uruguay Round, the United States also established new tariffs on imports of dairy and
other products.  But according to a USDA official, “U.S. products under the tariff-rate quota face
the lower NAFTA tariff, which will be phased out by 1998” (13).
More North-South Marketing Infrastructure
Increased U.S.-Canadian agricultural trade is creating a demand for better infrastructure for
moving goods north and south.  As these facilities are built and upgraded, the cost of north-south
trade will fall and the volume will continue to grow.  Expect rerouting of traditional marketing
flows of some goods within both countries.
Free Trade Narrows Domestic Policy Options
An end to border barriers diminishes policy options for income protection to agriculture in the
future.  Freer trade is inconsistent with, and eventually tends to remove, domestic commodity
programs.  To be sure, free trade can be consistent with “decoupled” policy instruments such as
direct payments.  But these are difficult to maintain in the face of pressure to restrain government
outlays.￿￿
Toward Monetary Union
Recent year-to-year fluctuations in bilateral agricultural trade can be attributed in part to changes
in the value of the Canadian dollar relative to the U.S. dollar.  High trade barriers--especially
nontariff barriers--buffer the agricultural sectors on both sides of the border from exchange rate
shocks.  Now that the barriers are reduced,  there is less protection from exchange rate risk.  For
example, a 25 percent decline in the real value of the Canadian dollar, as occurred between 1991
and 1995, would roughly translate into a 25 percent drop in the price of Canadian goods exported
to the U.S. market--a major improvement in their competitiveness.  On the other hand, U.S.
goods exported to Canada could cost 25 percent more in Canada.
Historic real exchange rate adjustments of over 50 percent, apparent in Figure 10, have
introduced uncertainty into trade between Canada and the United States.  The exchange rate
could emerge as an especially troublesome risk factor with the decline of other trade barriers. 
With an unpredictable shift in the exchange rate, enterprises with a comparative advantage and
making a profit on exports unexpectedly could find themselves taking losses on exports even
though technology, factor endowments, and management remain unchanged.  This instability adds
economic trauma and reduces the benefits to both countries from freer trade.  Eliminating
exchange rate risk deserves high priority in Canadian-United States trade relations.
Similar pressures have pushed the European Union toward monetary union.  Because of greater
similarities in cultural and other characteristics between the U.S. and Canada than between many
countries of Western Europe, a Canadian-U.S. monetary union would seem to be as feasible
economically as an EU monetary union.
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Table 1.  Provisions of CFTA Affecting Agriculture
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Item Action specified in CFTA
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technical regulations Committed to harmonize
Dispute settlement  Defined procedures, using binational panels, for resolving disputes
Tariff reductions * Cannot increase duties on products that were duty-free prior to 1/1/89
* Category A products:  Immediate duty removal (1/1/89)
* Category B products:  Duty eliminated in 5 equal annual stages (duty
free on 1/1/93)
* Category C products:  Duty eliminated in 10 equal annual stages
(duty-free on 1/1/98)
Export subsidies Prohibited on U.S.-Canada trade
Canada's transportation subsidy Canada's Western Grain Transportation Act subsidy removed on grain
and oilseed exports shipped to the U.S. through Canadian west coast
ports (removed August 1, 1995)
Meat import laws Each country exempts the other from its meat import laws
Wheat Canada removed import license in 1991
Barley Canada will remove import license when U.S. support level is less than
or equal to Canada's
Oats Canada removed import license in 1989
Chicken Canada increased global import quotas from 6.3% to 7.5% of previous
year's production
Turkey Canada increased global import quota from 2.0% to 3.5% of previous
year's production
Shell eggs Canada increased global import quota from 0.68% to 1.65% of previous
year's production
Sugar-containing products U.S. agreed not to restrict any Canadian product containing 10% or less
sugar, dry weight
Fruits and vegetables Special “snapback” provisions to protect domestic market from sharp
short-run drops in import prices
Wine Canada agreed to liberalize wine listing, pricing, and distribution
practices in order to afford improved access for U.S. wines.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  (3)￿￿
Table 2.  Agricultural Trade Between Canada and the United States, 1995
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. exports to       Canadian exports to
Category     Canada    United States
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 (million U.S. dollars)
Live animals   98 1035
Animal products  936 1090
Grains and products  977 1292
Fruit & juices, vegetables 2219  536
Oilseeds and products  357  613
Sugar and related products  166  178
Nursery products  108  124
Other beverages  479  529
Other  398  162
------ ------
     Total 5738 5559
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  (4).￿￿
Table 3.  Results of Regression Analysis using USDA Trade Data.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Dependent variable
                                           ------------------------------------------
                                                      U.S. ag.                           Canadian  
Equation characteristics                exports                          ag. exports    
                                                   to Canada                             to U.S.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of observations 27 27
Degrees of freedom 23 23
Real exchange rate:
  coefficient               -1017 1020
  T value              -1.27 0.88
Dummy for CFTA/NAFTA:
  coefficient                 2379 1566
  T value               10.28 4.69
Linear Trend
  coefficient  97 107
  T value                 4.29 3.27
R squared 0.97 0.94
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Form of equation:  Simple linear regression.
Units:
  Exports and imports: million US dollars.
  Real exchange rate: Canadian dollars per US dollar. 
    Values range from 0.85 to 1.39.
  Dummy: 0 for years without CFTA/NAFTA, 1 for years with CFTA/NAFTA. 
    Note that 1989 = 0, i.e., a one-year lag in CFTA/NAFTA's impact
    was assumed.
  Linear Trend: 1969 = 1, 1970 = 2,...,1995 = 27.
Sources:  Exports, (1); real exchange rates, (5).￿￿
Table 4.  Results of Regression Analysis using STATISTICS CANADA Trade Data.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Dependent variable
                                           ------------------------------------------
                                                   U.S. ag.                        Canadian  
Equation characteristics             exports                        ag. exports    
                                             to Canada                           to U.S.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of observations 27 27
Degrees of freedom 23 23
Real exchange rate:
  coefficient               -1839 472
  T value             -2.86 0.34
Dummy for CFTA/NAFTA:
  coefficient                  481 2203
  T value               2.59 5.62
Linear Trend
  coefficient                 186  120
  T value             10.30 3.13
R squared               0.98 0.94
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Form of equation:  Simple linear regression.
Units:
  Exports and imports: million US dollars.
  Real exchange rate: Canadian dollars per US dollar. 
    Values range from 0.85 to 1.39.
  Dummy: 0 for years without CFTA/NAFTA, 1 for years with CFTA/NAFTA. 
    Note that 1989 = 0, i.e., a one-year lag in CFTA/NAFTA's impact
    was assumed.
  Linear Trend: 1969 = 1, 1970 = 2,...,1995 = 27.
Sources:  Exports, (1); real exchange rates, (5).￿￿
ANNEX A
Text Figure 9 and Annex Figure 1 show differences in trade data compiled by the U.S. and
Canada.  The U.S.-source data show a U.S. trade surplus in recent years while Canada-source
data show a Canadian surplus.  That outcome may please citizens of the respective countries but
both countries cannot enjoy trade surplus at the same time!  We were unable to reconcile the two
sources of data from information on coverage of commodities and transshipments, although the
U.S. data on exports to Canada appear to be underestimated in the 1980s.￿￿
ANNEX B
Illustration of Welfare Analysis Methodology:  Canadian Sugar Policy
The following analysis of Canadian sugar policy in 1990 assumes Canada is a “small
country”, influenced by world (and U.S.) sugar prices but not influencing sugar prices.  Four
scenarios are considered:
1.  An end to the modest Canadian tariff of C $22/ton so that Canada is a free market.
2.  Canada adopts the U.S. support level of C $507/ton over and above its 1990 support
rate of C $309/ton.
3.  Canada adopts the U.S. support level of C $507/ton but measuring welfare above the
world price of C $287/ton.
4.  Canada and U.S. accept free market in sugar.
Basic data and supply-demand conditions are given below where Pu is the U.S. support price, Pc is
the Canadian support price, and Pw is the world price, all in Canadian dollars.  The first subscript
on quantities q refers to production p and consumption c and the second subscript refers to
quantities at world (w), Canadian (c), and U.S. (u) prices.
Annex Figure 2.  Canadian Sugar (refined equivalent) Supply and Demand in 1990.
















Source:  Quantities and prices (11, pp. 94, 95); elasticities (15)
q pw = 119,318 tons
q pc = 122,000
q pu = 141,592
q cu = 895,668
q cc = 1,009,000
q cw = 1,027,107
E sup = .3
E dem = -.24
q p = 21,846 P.3
q c = 3,994,673P-.24￿￿
Welfare Analysis
Canadian Sugar Policy in 1990
Scenario 1. Canada ends support so price falls from $309/ton to $287/ton, the world price
Gain to: Area (Annex figure 2) Canadian dollars (1,000)
Producers -1  -2,661
Consumers    +1 to 10  22,449
Taxpayers          -4-8    -19,558
Nation 2+6       230
Scenario 2. Canada adopts U.S. support level of $507/ton — welfare over and above
current support $309/ton
Gain to: Area Canadian dollars (1,000)
Producers 10    26,156
Consumers    -7-8-9-10  -188,991
Taxpayers           8         149,647
Nation        -7-9         -13,188
Scenario 3. Canada adopts U.S. support level of $507/ton — welfare over and above that
at the world price of $287/ton
Gain to: Area Canadian dollars (1,000)
Producers       1+10    28,817
Consumers    -(1 to 10) -211,440
Taxpayers        4+8       166,270
Nation  -2-3-5-6-7-9   -16,353
Area values (C$1,000)
1  2,661   6       200
2     30   7     11,245
3    432   8    149,646
4 16,627   9      1,944
5  2,499 10     26,155￿￿
Scenario 4. Canada and United States liberalize sugar trade; world sugar price goes to C
$400/ton.  Gain above current policy by price Pc going from C $380 to C
$400/ton.
Gain to: Area Canadian dollars (1,000)
Producers         10  11,549
Consumers    -7-8-9-10 -89,061
Nation      -7-8-9    -77,512